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The Loss of HMCS Clayoquot 
Lieutenant-Commander Doug McLean 
T he torpedo struck without warning. HMCS Clayoquot was returning from an 
anti-submarine sweep in the approaches to 
Halifax harbour when its stern rose into the 
air, mangled by the detonation of a German 
T -5 acoustic homing torpedo. The men aboard 
felt two concussions, the second likely being 
depth charges stored on Clayoquot's stern set 
off by the torpedo. Whatever the details, the 
explosions were devastating for the small 
Bangor class minesweeper. 1 A grainy 
photograph of the doomed ship shows the 
stern blasted vertical, the ship listing to 
starboard. Clayoquot lasted barely ten 
minutes after being hit, just long enough for 
all but eight of her crew to escape. The worst 
fate befell two young officers trapped in the 
port forward cabin. These men called out 
through a port hole for axes to chop their way 
to freedom, but all the axes were underwater. 2 
The merciless sea closed around them as the 
ship vanished. 3 
A German U-boat lying a few short miles 
off Canada's coast claimed Clayoquot. Though 
the war was drawing to an end in late 1944, 
these dangerous predators still roamed the 
seas in significant numbers. The Canadian 
warship became another victim in a what was 
known as the U -boat's inshore offensive. 4 
This had started modestly during the late 
summer and fall of 1944, and one of the U-
boat's operating areas was off Canada's east 
coast. The renewed onslaught did not raise 
shipping losses to the levels experienced in 
the dark days of 1942, but the unexpected 
success ofU-boats after their crushing defeat 
in 1943 nonetheless caused concern. German 
submarines exercised their deadly craft with 
initially modest success in Canada's coastal 
waters in late 1944. 
U -boats were certainly no strangers to the 
east coast. In 1942 they inflicted serious 
losses on traffic in the Gulf of St Lawrence, 
sinking twenty-two vessels in that year alone. 5 
On 9 September 1942 the Canadian 
government went so far as to close the Gulf to 
transatlantic shipping. 6 The small number 
and poor quality of Canadian surface escorts 
available in Canadian waters, a result of the 
commitment of most of the RCN's modest 
strength to trans-Atlantic convoys, 
contributed to that German success. 7 
The Royal Canadian Air Force had a more 
pervasive presence in Canadian coastal waters 
during this period. Training airfields in the 
Maritimes contributed to the large number of 
patrolling aircraft. An aggressive campaign 
by the RCAF hindered and harassed the U-
boats in 1942, almost holding them in check 
by forcing them to dive repeatedly, but the 
RCAF lacked the skill and equipment to 
destroy sufficient U-boats in 1942 to force 
them to break off the campaign. Although 
short of the equipment required for night 
operations, the RCAF's frequent appearance 
and occasional attacks significantly reduced 
the mobility of the U-boats. Unfortunately, 
this availed little when the U-boats were 
sitting close inshore in choke points where 
shipping had to pass. The deadly harvest of 
ships in the Gulf of St. Lawrence was a good 
indication of the formidable damage that could 
be inflicted by a small number of U-boats, 
even when badgered by frequent air patrols. 8 
The RCN expected a renewal of the German 
onslaught in 1943 and made what 
preparations it could. 9 Fortunately, events in 
other parts of the Atlantic were the main 
focus of German effort in the first half of 1943 
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and by the second half successful Allied 
countermeasures made German efforts to 
operate across the Atlantic far more difficult. 
The most important new measures leading to 
this success were increasingly accurate and 
specific intelligence that allowed U-boats to 
be hunted during their transits with deadly 
result and more and deadlier antisubmarine 
aircraft, equipped with better radar. 
These developments made travelling on 
the surface at any time perilous for U-boats. 
This dramatically reduced U-boat mobility, 
and generated concern in the German 
submarine fleet about rising to the surface at 
any time. While surface travel might seem 
unnecessary for such vessels, the truth was 
that U-boats were far from true submarines, 
and were designed for only limited submerged 
operations. Their electric batteries held a 
modest charge, and could propel U-boats for 
only short periods at low speeds underwater. 
If operated at minimum speed, or conserved 
by resting on the bottom, a U-boat under 
32 
Two views of HMCS 
Clayoquot: 
Left: Near Esquimalt, 
B.C. shortly after her 
commissioning, ca. 
October 1 941 . 
NAC PA 157582 
Right: During working-
up exercises off Pictou, 
N.S. in July 1943. 
Photo by G.A. Milne, 
NAC PA 116969 
duress might last almost two days before 
being forced to re-charge and renew its air 
supply. Normally, however, aU-boat had to 
spend a minimum of three to four hours on 
the surface every day to keep its batteries 
charged. 
Faced with the need to reduce their 
exposure to the surface, the Germans 
responded by adopting a Dutch invention: 
the schnorkel. Little more than two small 
tubes which allowed air to be drawn into the 
boat and exhaust vented, the schnorkel 
permitted U-boats to recharge their batteries 
and, after a fashion, renew their air supply 
without surfacing. It could be raised 
hydraulically when the U -boat was at 
periscope depth, allowing the diesel engines 
to operate at moderate speeds. U -boats using 
schnorkels could continue their underwater 
transit at speeds averaging five knots. 
Although automatic valves prevented seawater 
from entering in rough weather, any 
disruption in the air supply threatened 
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disaster if the crew could not either bring the 
schnorkel head above the surface immediately 
or switch back to battery power. 10 Whenever 
the sea rose over the top of the tube, an 
intense vacuum arose in the boat as the 
diesel engines sucked air from the interior of 
the vessel to feed their combustion. There 
was another drawback in that the use of 
diesels while schnorkelling also drowned out 
sounds from outside the boat, with sometimes 
fatal results when Allied escorts literally 
stumbled on to themY 
Schnorkel use resulted in barely tolerable 
conditions aboard submarines that were 
already cramped and uncomfortable. Without 
it, however, the U-boats were too exposed to 
the ubiquitous searching radar beams of now 
plentiful Allied anti-submarine aircraft and 
surface escorts. Hunting now became a matter 
of lurking in wait for shipping to pass, with 
discomfort traded for the stealth necessary to 
survive. These new tactics became known to 
the Allies as 'static' tactics. 12 
Schnorkel-fitted U-boats first appeared 
in significant numbers in the summer of 
1944. Operations against the Allied invasion 
of Normandy proved that only U-boats 
equipped with schnorkels could now survive. 13 
It also became apparent that some success 
might be gained if schnorkel boats operated 
in the shallow waters near shipping lanes as 
shallow water provided a very difficult 
environment for asdic or sonar. 14 
The first schnorkel U -boats began to enter 
Canadian waters in the late summer of 1944. 15 
U-802 and U-541 managed to reach the Gulf 
of St. Lawrence, but then sank but one 
merchant ship between them. Their 
harassment by the RCN and RCAF was 
augmented by the efforts of U.S. Navy aircraft 
carrier "hunter-killer" groups, which were 
skilled in stalking U-boats in transit across 
the Atlantic. U-802 had, in fact, been fortunate 
to survive two brushes with the USS Bogue 
escort carrier group en route to Canadian 
waters. 16 In October a third U-boat, U-1223, 
33 
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attacked a Gulf of St. Lawrence convoy, 
blowing the stern off-but not sinking-the 
frigate HMCS Magog. Eighteen days later the 
same U -boat damaged SS Fort Thompson with 
a torpedo. This record of minor successes 
continued later in November when another 
wave of three U -boats arrived in Canadian 
waters. On the night of 24/25 November 
U-1228 sank the corvette HMCS Shawinigan 
off Port aux Basques, Newfoundland, while 
U-1230 sent a merchant ship to the bottom in 
the Gulf of Maine on 3 DecemberY 
These results barely justified the intense 
effort required to send these U -boats across a 
hostile ocean. While the RCN and RCAF 
deserve some credit, a lack of skill and daring 
in these U-boats contributed to their poor 
performance. New U-boats, one in mid-
December and the second at the end of the 
month, soon demonstrated what determined 
U -boats, aggressively handled, could 
accomplish. In a few short weeks these 
submarines would account for five merchant 
ships, damage a sixth, and sink HMCS 
Clayoquot. 18 
The encounter between HMCS Clayoquot 
and U-806 well illustrates a typical naval 
engagement during this period ofthe shipping 
war. The action occurred in shallow waters, 
in daylight, and in a focal point where shipping 
had to pass. The approaches to the port of 
Halifax were seldom targeted by U-boats in 
the early part of the war, and even when the 
inshore offensive began U -boats generally 
steered clear of the RCN's main base. This 
changed dramatically on 21 December, when 
aU -boat revealed its presence close off Halifax 
harbour by torpedoing and damaging the 
Liberty ship SS Samtucky. Although the 
Operational Intelligence Centre at NSHQ had 
correctly reported that several U-boats were 
operating in the Canadian coastal zone, none 
were considered to be off Halifax. 19 Indeed, 
naval authorities initially believed that the 
damage to Samtucky came from a mine. 20 
Examination of the ship, however, revealed 
that it had been the victim of a torpedo 
attack. 21 The Commander-in-ChiefCanadian 
Northwest Atlantic (CINCCNA), Rear Admiral 
L.W. Murray, RCN, countered with increased 
patrols, and it was on one ofthese that HMCS 
34 
Clayoquot was sunk within sight of Chebucto 
Head. 
U-806 carried out both attacks. 
Commanded by Kapitan zur See Klaus 
Hornbostel, it was on its first and only 
operational patrol. Her crew was typical of 
many U-boats at this stage of the war, lacking 
submarine experience in many cases and on 
their first naval patrol of any kind in a 
surprising number of instances. Hornbostel, 
though a naval officer with surface warfare 
experience, had never previously been on an 
actual U-boat patrol. His Executive Officer 
was a former mines weeping officer, and his 
Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) navigator 
was a former army signalman. Only in some 
of the vital technical NCO positions did 
Hornbostel possess experienced U-boat men, 
and their presence was critical. The crew 
received all the individual specialist courses 
required, and were then welded into a unit by 
training together in U-806, but the lack of 
experience could only detract from their 
chances of success. Still, Germany's 
increasingly desperate situation allowed no 
more tirpe and the boat left Kiel, Germany, on 
14 October 1944.22 
On its way across it spent a short period 
in mid-Atlantic monitoring the weather, 
hazardous duty at this stage of the war as it 
required frequent use of a radio to report 
observations. 23 On 13 November Bejehlshaber 
der U-boote (U -boat Command Headquarters, 
hereafter BdU) ordered U-806 to head for the 
Nova Scotian coast. Hornbostel's destination 
became Halifax on 30 November after further 
direction from BdU. After a voyage of 4,400 
miles the boat arrived off Halifax on 13 
December. 24 
Once off the -port Hornbostel spent over a 
week lurking, becoming familiar with the 
area before attempting to strike at a convoy 
entering the port. The numerous navigational 
aids found off Halifax, especially the anchored 
Sambro lightship, greatly assisted German 
submariners in getting their bearings, but 
the difficulty of operating submerged, 
restricted to slow speeds made their task 
formidably difficult. Despite patient 
preparation, U-806's first effort achieved only 
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marginal success as two separate salvoes 
were required when the convoy, in order to 
navigate the harbour entrance safely, altered 
course away from the submarine's first pair 
of torpedoes. Only one torpedo of the second 
salvo of two hit, damaging SS Samtucky. 
U-806 failed in another attempt on 22 
December, expending three more torpedoes in 
a fruitless effort against what Hornbostel saw 
as a standard freighter escorted by a "zig-zagging 
found himself well positioned to intercept the 
Boston bound convoy XB 139 as it left Halifax 
during the forenoon. A complex situation 
developed as this action began, which resulted 
in HMCS Clayoquot presenting, 
unintentionally, a threat which U-806 could 
not ignore. Two convoys were leaving Halifax 
at about the same time, XB 139 of 12 merchant 
ships, and HJF 36, consisting of the troop 
transport Lady Rodney escorted by the 
The crew of U-806 prior to her operational cruise qf 1944. Note the schnorkel by the rear cif the conning tower. 
Flower class corvette." Of the three torpedoes 
fired only one appeared to function properly, 
the second failing to leave its tube, while the 
third went out of control after leaving its 
tube. 25 
The U-boat's persistence and growing 
familiarity with the shipping routes in the 
Halifax approaches were finally rewarded two 
days later. On 24 December Hornbostel 
CFPU PMR 82-100 
corvette HMCS Fennel and the minesweeper 
HMCS Burlington (see figure 1 ). 26 The relative 
position of the two convoys is not readily 
apparent from the records, and that shown in 
the figure is an estimate. The log of U-806 
indicates that the U-boat never saw the troop 
transport, but sighted one of her escorts. 
Hornbostel spotted the long column of 
merchantmen in convoy XB-139 threading 
its way out of Halifax harbour, though, and 
35 
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proceeded northwest to intercept. The 
U -boat had been loitering in its normal patrol 
area near the Sambro Light Vessel (not shown 
in this figure, but just off the bottom right of 
the chart). The intercept probably took place 
at four to five knots: slow underwater speed 
severely limited "old" U -boats, like U-806, a 
Type IX C/40. This constrained advance 
prevented Hornbostel from intercepting the 
convoy before its escorts could take station. 
The three escorts-the frigate HMCS Kirkland 
Lake, and the minesweepers HMC Ships 
Clayoquot and Transcona-had left the 
harbour earlier that day to conduct an anti-
submarine sweep along the convoy's intended 
path, a direct consequence of the attack on 
Samtucky just three days previously. They 
were all returning to rendezvous with the 
convoy, on a course of 330° speed 11-12 
knots, in a line abreast formation, 2000 yards 
between ships, inadvertently overtaking the 
slower U-806 in its attempt to reach convoy 
XB 139. 
The attack occurred just after the moment 
shown in the figure. Hornbostel apparently 
struck in response to a change in course and 
speed by HMCS Clayoquot, the closest escort. 
Clayoquot had, in fact, altered to take up its 
assigned station on XB 139, an order signalled 
by the Senior Officer in Kirkland Lake. This 
sudden change, when less than 1000 yards 
from U-806, suggested that Clayoquot had 
detected the U-boat and intended an attack. 
Faced with a rapidly closing escort, Hornbostel 
hurriedly fired an acoustic homing torpedo 
from his stern tubes, and then dove to 50 
metres to avoid the danger of the torpedo 
homing back onto the submarine. This 
torpedo struck Clayoquot after only 69 
seconds, equating to a run not greater than 
900 yards. 27 
The appearance of these three escorts 
disrupted the attack by U-806 on XB 139. By 
the time the distracted U-boat returned its 
attention to the convoy the first ship was 
within 300 yards, too close to attack with 
torpedoes. Hornbostel quickly shifted to a 
more distant merchant ship and fired a second 
acoustic torpedo. During this brief period 
between the two attacks-about ten to fifteen 
minutes-both the submarine and the convoy 
36 
maintained their initial courses: the first 
northwest and the latter southeast. 
Meanwhile the escorts reacted to the hit on 
Clayoquot by immediately streaming their 
anti-acoustic torpedo decoys and searching 
aggressively for the submarine. One of the 
escorts ofHJF 36, Fennel, joined in the search 
for U-806 while the second, Burlington, 
escorted the troop transport back into Halifax 
harbour. Convoy XB 139 turned around after 
the second attack by U-806. The submarine's 
second torpedo detected the decoy streamed 
by Transcona and detonated harmlessly in 
that ship's. wake. U-806 heard the explosion, 
but did not realize the fruitless result, 
attributing the absence of"breaking up noises" 
usually heard as a torpedoed ship begins to 
sink to the noise of the convoy passing 
overhead. 28 U-806 also decided that discretion 
was in order with escorts apparently 
everywhere and, continuing on its course to 
the northwest, came to rest on the bottom in 
68 metres of water in the vicinity of Buoy 1. 29 
While Hornbostel and his crew crossed 
their fingers, the men of Clayoquot did their 
best to survive the harsh Atlantic. Two clear 
thinking seaman used axes to chop the falls 
of Clayoquot's whaler, allowing its use. All of 
the ship's carley floats were also released. In 
addition, most of the crew were able to don 
lifejackets during the brief minutes before 
Clayoquot took her final plunge. The result 
was that, except for those unfortunate few 
trapped or killed in the initial explosions, 
everyone was able to scramble into the cold 
water. HMCS Fennel, appreciating that men 
exposed to the frigid waters could not last 
long, rushed to pick up survivors. Launching 
her own whaler, she was able to pick up 3 
officers and 72 sailors in short order. This 
episode was the high point of the day, and 
demonstrated a good standard of seamanship. 
The result was that the death toll was kept to 
eight men, when the cold waters might well 
have been expected to claim more. 30 
The attack by U-806 demonstrated both 
the advantages and disadvantages faced by 
U-boats operating in shallow coastal waters. 
By prowling in focal areas of shipping, such 
as channels just outside harbours, aggressive 
captains could hope to ambush shipping. On 
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the other hand, focal areas were inevitably 
closely watched by escorts. Even if the anti-
submarine patrols had problems locating 
U-boats in the difficult acoustic conditions 
often found in shallow water, their presence 
had a deterrent effect. Clayoquot never 
detected the U-boat that sank her, nor did 
her consorts, and the search that ensued was 
equally unsuccessful. 31 Nonetheless, the 
attack had achieved little. The small success 
of sinking one minor escort scarcely repaid 
the immense effort required to send a 
submarine on a patrol which, in the case of 
U-806, lasted over four months. 32 
Operations in shallow, defended waters 
imposed constraints on U-boats which tended 
to limit their results. Unable to surface 
because of the threat of numerous escorts 
and the ever present danger of radar-equipped 
aircraft, the U-boat could only proceed 
submerged at slow speed. Worse, the poor 
and sometimes misleading acoustic conditions 
in shallow water forced the U-boat to rely on 
visual information for targeting data. 33 This 
required the exposure of a periscope with the 
attendant risk that it might be sighted by the 
escorts concentrated in the area. Although a 
periscope is a difficult object to spot, U -boat 
commanders knew that many eyes were 
searching for his one small periscope, while 
his were the only eyes that the U-boat had 
available. There can be little doubt that the 
desire to avoid exposing a periscope more 
often than necessary contributed significantly 
to the caution displayed by many U-boats. 
The exceedingly limited and fragmentary 
information that submerged U-boats could 
gather about the rapidly changing situation 
around them largely explains how U-806 could 
miss sighting the large troop transport that 
must have passed close to her and how the 
adventitious alteration of course by Clayoquot 
could be mistaken for a threat. 
U-806 lay silently on the bottom to avoid 
detection using a regular U-boat tactic often 
employed since the summer of 1944.34 The 
RCN's search for U-806 in the wake of the 
attack on Clayoquot leaves no doubt that 
bottoming tactics were anticipated.35 An 
assessment passed just hours after the search 
began read: "If submarine bottomed after 
38 
firing, which is probable, he will try to clear 
the area tonight on schnorkel. "36 The 
command of this search first lay in the hands 
of the senior naval officer on the scene, in this 
case the commanding officer ofHMCS Kirkland 
Lake, Commander N.V. Clark, RCN. A few 
hours later, however, the training commander 
of the port of Halifax, Commander Aubrey, 
RN, arrived to take charge. This event has 
been characterized by some Canadian 
historians as "the kind of RN assumption of 
superiority that really galled. "37 On the other 
hand, the uncertain state of tactical anti-
submarine doctrine in Canadian waters which 
characterizes this period perhaps suggests 
that sending out an officer with the most up-
to-date information on tactical procedures 
was perhaps a prudent step. At about the 
same time as Commander Aubrey arrived the 
ad hoc group of ships was designated group 
W-12. 
The change of command did not alter the 
tactics. The initial reaction, as already 
discussed, was to deploy decoys against 
acoustic torpedoes and to search aggressively 
at moderately high speeds. This gave little 
chance of locating the submarine, because 
the racket produced by the acoustic decoys 
interfered severely with asdic. But, the object 
was less detection than deterrence in this 
phase, and in this the escorts were successful. 
Hornbostel judged it prudent to keep his 
periscope down after his parthian shot. 
During this period the ships concentrated on 
sweeping the area near the torpedo attacks. 
The next phase of the search began after 
the convoys had returned to the safety of 
Halifax harbour. A small group of ships- the 
average number being three-stayed in the 
vicinity of the torpedo attacks while additional 
ships dispatched out of Halifax were placed 
on a growing perimeter designed to contain 
the submarine and prevent its escape. The 
plan bears a close resemblance 'to one 
forwarded by Lieutenant-Commander Plomer 
on 7 November 1944.38 Reflecting the current 
state of uncertainty with respect to RCN 
tactical doctrine he observed that in the event 
of a submarine search in shallow water "there 
is no [suitable] search plan laid down in 
A.C.I.s [Atlantic Convoy Instructions]." He 
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went on to comment that "in a few instances 
recently had some form of search been 
available in various escort groups, that could 
immediately be carried out, the chances of 
detection would have been immeasurably 
increased." The area plan which accompanied 
Plomer's memorandum was a combination of 
plans developed earlier in the war, the first 
called observant, and the second a square 
search. This combination called for a group 
to send two ships to search in the vicinity of 
a possible U -boat, the example in the proposed 
plan being near a torpedoed ship, while the 
remaining ships began a square search 
outside of the two inner ships. The suggested 
dimensions of the two searches were two 
miles for observant and six miles for the 
square search, although the size ofthe square 
search depended on the possible "furthest on 
position" of the U-boat. The RCN would still 
be searching for a standard tactical doctrine 
for inshore ASW when the war ended. 39 
The whole search plan was oriented on 
Sambro Light Vessel for ease of navigation. 
The search perimeter gradually expanded 
from 2 nautical miles in radius, ordered at 
1445 local time, 40 to 5 miles at 1523 local. 41 
Finally, after sunset, some nine and a half 
hours after the first torpedo attack, the 
perimeter became 10 miles, an area that 
encompassed the position where U-806 still 
lay quietly on the bottom. Commander Aubrey 
had indicated his intention to adopt this 
larger perimeter several hours earlier, but 
delayed for reasons unknown. 42 Ships 
patrolling the perimeter proceeded at equally 
spaced intervals at 12 knots, with their 
acoustic decoys streamed. They were further 
directed to carry out a listening sweep with 
their hydrophones after every second active 
"sweep," with the hope of detecting the noisy 
diesel engines of the U-boat if it began to 
schnorkel. Inside the perimeter Kirkland 
Lake and two other escorts continued a 
deliberate search at slow speed concentrated 
on the area immediately around the position 
of the initial attacks. This style of search was 
commonly employed to find a bottomed 
submarine.43 
This plan contained the essential elements 
necessary to counter the tactics available to 
U-806. The initial reaction successfully 
thwarted the threat to convoy XB 139. The 
ensuing search was designed both to cut off 
any escape by the submarine and to search 
the most likely locations for a bottomed 
submarine. Perimeter patrols by ships 
proceeding at the moderately high speed of 
HMCS Clayoquot minutes before sinking. 
CFPU PMR 83-305 
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12 knots with acoustic decoys deployed was 
perhaps questionable, but since their main 
job was containment, a reasonable argument 
can be made for a higher search speed and a 
noisy decoy. Certainly the decoys greatly 
reduced the danger of additional escorts 
sharing Clayoquot's fate. Details concerning 
the ships doing the deliberate search inside 
the perimeter are scanty, but it would appear 
that they conducted the search at a lower 
speed since several detections and attacks 
were made on what turned out to be non-
submarine contacts. One of these contacts 
was in fact the wreck of Clayoquot, which 
suffered the indignity of being depth charged 
before it was identified. In fact, expenditure 
of ammunition quickly became one of the 
concerns of the searching ships because so 
much ordnance was discharged on false 
contacts. Despite the apparent extravagance 
of such an approach, it was completely in 
keeping with current tactics. The escorts, 
moreover, used echo sounders to attempt to 
verify contacts as either submarine, wreck, 
or bottom features. When the escorts passed 
over top of a contact the echo sounder would 
produce a trace or "picture," which indicated 
the length and height of the bottom contact, 
sometimes even exposing the tell tale conning 
tower of a submarine. The escorts also 
endeavoured to establish the identity of 
bottom contacts by comparing their positions 
with that of known wrecks. In short, the 
escorts followed current procedures to the 
best of their ability. Yet the warships were 
unsuccessful and U-806 escaped. 
The U-boat had slowly moved out of the 
area after resting on the bottom for twelve 
hours, hovering just above the bottom at low 
speed. U-806's log records that at least six 
escorts passed directly overhead, but made 
no contact. 44 The fact that such "detection 
opportunities" occurred demonstrated the 
tactical validity of the search plans employed. 
Indeed, U-806's log describes the search as so 
tightly organized that "... despite evasive 
action, there was no way to avoid them passing 
over the boat at times. "45 The failure to make 
a detection may have been the result of 
inattention in the searching ships, inadequate 
training of operators, or of difficult water 
conditions. 
40 
The last explanation is the most likely. 
Water conditions off Halifax in winter are 
notoriously poor and a submarine remaining 
close to the bottom presented a very difficult 
target. Cold winter weather caused this, as 
the frigid air cooled the water at the surface 
to near freezing temperatures. As a result, 
water temperature increased with depth in 
the winter, which caused sound to be bent 
upward as it travelled through the water. 
Finding U-boats near the bottom in these 
conditions was extremely difficult. In better 
conditions, such a search might well have 
been successful. This is not to say that the 
search was unflawed. The almost complete 
lack of group organization among the escorts 
greatly hampered operations. Kirkland Lake, 
for example, had to use the most primitive 
forms of communication to overcome the 
incompatible codes and equipment carried 
aboard the diverse vessels. 46 It is also clear 
that the search plan was based on the most 
convenient and expedient procedure available, 
likely because the Senior Officer did not believe 
that a more sophisticated approach was 
possible. The extension of the containment 
perimeter appears to have been more the 
result of improvisation than careful planning, 
reflecting the ad hoc arrival of reinforcements 
rather than calculation of the U -boat's likely 
escape speedsY Nonetheless, essentially 
effective and correct actions had prevented 
the submarine from sinking merchant 
shipping, and allowed it to escape only by 
pushing both its crew and its capabilities to 
the limit. The fact that U-806 did not dare 
raise its schnorkel to renew its air supply for 
a period of over 40 hours, approaching its 
design limits, demonstrates the concern which 
the escorts had instilled in its commander. 
This was perhaps the best that could be 
expected given the water conditions off Halifax 
and the somewhat ramshackle organization 
of ships. 
One of the two Support Escort Groups in 
Canadian waters at the time, EG 27, played a 
minor role in this episode. This was because 
the group, returning from a convoy they had 
escorted well out to sea, did not reach the 
Halifax area until nearly 24 hours after the 
attack. 48 Initially intended to search the 
bottom in the area of the torpedo attack, the 
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Survivors from the HMCS Clayoquot being picked up by the HMCS Fennel. 
situation had changed so much by the time 
EG 27 arrived that this plan was dropped. 
The report of a submarine sighting seventy-
five miles south of Halifax by an RCAF aircraft 
on 25 December confused the search for 
U-806 as well. 49 This caused EG 27 to be 
diverted to the new datum before it even 
reached the area where Clayoquot had been 
torpedoed. The location and time of sighting 
made it plausible that the submarine sighted 
could have been U-806, although Canadian 
authorities recognised the possibility that 
there could be a second submarine in the 
area. German records confirm that neither 
U-806 nor the second U-boat operating close 
in to Halifax harbour-U-1231-were 
responsible for the sighting report. 50 Whatever 
the actual nature of the sighting, whether 
U-boat or whale, the search off Halifax was 
much reduced in intensity. In fact, the ad hoc 
group specifically designated to search for 
U-806, W-12, conducted one more sweep of 
the Halifax approaches after returning from 
their futile dash out to investigate the aircraft 
report and returned to harbour late on the 
CFPU PMR 83-368 
26th. 51 EG 27 spent time futilely searching 
for the submarine reported by the aircraft 
and then conducted several more searches in 
the Halifax area. The group finally returned 
to Halifax harbour for several days alongside 
on 29 December, 1944, as the fruitless search 
for U-806 ground to a halt. 
The attack was the last aggressive activity 
for U-806 in Canadian waters, and the U-boat 
began its return transit on 4 January 1945.52 
Its efforts had sunk only one ship, a Canadian 
Bangor class minesweeper, and damaged one 
merchantman. Its audacious probing of the 
entrance to Halifax harbour demonstrated 
the potential for submarine operations in this 
difficult area and the comparative futility of 
anti-submarine efforts in the face of atrocious 
water conditions. Within weeks of U-806's 
departure, U-1232 sank two ships just east of 
Halifax on 4 January 1945 and then three 
more merchantmen on 14 January within a 
stone's throw of where U-806 had lain on the 
bottom to avoid detection, transforming 
potential into reality. 53 
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The encounter between U-806 and the 
RCN on 24 December is hardly unique. It 
does stand, however, as an excellent example 
of the "state of the art" in anti-submarine 
warfare near the end of the Second World 
War. It was a groping battle between 
opponents who could only gain momentary 
glimmers of the location of their prey, resulting 
in brief and violent episodes of death and 
destruction. The difficult conditions under 
which both sides laboured helps to explain 
the inconclusive outcome. The lack of 
sufficient completely trained ships and, 
especially, trained groups of ships bears on 
the lack of success achieved by the Royal 
Canadian Navy in this contest. It might be 
said that this battle demonstrates that despite 
the passage of over five years of war and the 
stubborn bravery of the RCN's sailors, the 
defence of Canada's most important east coast 
port remained unsatisfactory. 
The Royal Canadian Navy grew from a tiny 
force of six destroyers and five minesweepers 
at the start of the war to a fleet of hundreds 
of ships by 1945. 54 These ships were manned 
by crews that were becoming accustomed to 
the rig ours of the sea and most of whom had 
spent countless hours learning their new 
naval skills. Despite the size and growing 
experience of Canada's navy, many shortfalls 
remained. One of the most serious was that 
training procedures were still rudimentary in 
advanced areas of naval warfare. 55 As well, 
despite the size of the RCN, there were not 
enough ships available to adequately defend 
Canada's most important east coast port, due 
to the dispatch of the majority of its best 
trained and equipped ASW escorts across the 
Atlantic. 56 The harsh conditions typical off 
Halifax in the winter, conditions which were 
more extreme both climactically and 
oceanographically than those found in the 
British littoral, contributed to the poor results. 
A detailed review of the encounter indicates 
that Canadian escorts faced an extremely 
difficult task off Halifax. Asdic conditions 
were generally terrible in the winter, and 
provided U -boats with a high degree oftactical 
immunity from detection by sonic sensors. 
The counter-measures employed by Canadian 
42 
escorts were in keeping with the best tactical 
thought of the day, and such procedures 
might well have been rewarded with success 
in better conditions. 
While the environment was possibly the 
major reason for the RCN's failure, significant 
shortcomings were evident in Canada's naval 
defences. The lack of organized groups has 
already been remarked upon. Further, those 
groups that were available suffered from a 
lack of advanced training, most prominently 
in the important area of group training. The 
best example of this is the record of one of the 
few specialized groups intended specifically 
for prolonged ASW searches: EG 27. One 
ship-Meon-in this group was well 
experienced, and many of the officers and 
men in all the ships were veterans of the 
Battle of the Atlantic, but the newly-organised 
group spent only one day between its 
formation and the search for U-806 in group 
training. The lack of training contributed to 
the failure to find the U -boat, and does not 
bespeak a well organized naval establishment. 
The effort to improvise a large navy from 
almost nothing had produced large quantities 
of ships, but resulted in escorts of uneven 
quality. In short, the RCN still had far to go, 
despite the great strides taken. 
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